1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF OREGON	
3	THE HON. MICHAEL R. HOGAN, JUDGE PRESIDING	
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6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )	
7	Government, )	
8	v. )	No. 6:10-cr-60066-HO
9	STEVEN DWIGHT HAMMOND and DWIGHT ) LINCOLN HAMMOND, JR., )	
10	Defendants.	
11	)	
12		
13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
14	EUGENE, OREGON	
15	TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2012	
16	PAGES 1 - 34	
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## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2012

THE CLERK: Now is the time for 10-60066, United States of America versus Steven Dwight Hammond and Dwight Lincoln Hammond, Jr., time set for sentencing.

THE COURT: Good morning, gentlemen.

With regard to our schedule, first, I have read all the materials that have been submitted and -- including all of the letters. I just read the last one just now. And what -- there are quite a few issues that we can talk about today. I am going to take your input, your argument on those, and then I am going to take a break in this sentencing. I have a couple of civil motions to hear and a break so that I can organize some thoughts on paper. Much of my reading of this material has been on airplanes the last couple of days, so I want to make sure that I communicate as clearly as I can.

So with that in mind, Mr. Papagni, do you have something more you wish to say that's not in your papers?

MR. PAPAGNI: I suspect the last letter you read was the one from Steven Hammond's wife.

THE COURT: It is.

MR. PAPAGNI: That's the one I just read too. My comments are going to be kind of in the order of the issues so I don't have to spend much time with them.

I want the court to know that my cocounsel,

Ms. Sgarlata, is not present today because she is very sick

with the flu and she's home in bed. Her role, as the court

knows, in this prosecution focused on the damages or loss.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PAPAGNI: The paralegal, Ms. Root, is also not present. She is stuck in Virginia because of Hurricane Sandy. I relied upon her quite heavily in this case because she was the only member of the original prosecution team who had been involved in this case from the beginning, and her input to me was pretty important.

So you are stuck with me today.

What I am going to try to do is go through the issues that were raised by the defense lawyers. I should comment that the defendants have been very ably represented by Mr. Blackman and Mr. Matasar. They certainly have raised every issue they thought appropriate, and they certainly have made me do my job, as I am supposed to.

In the past five days, they have raised some issues that I have to respond to. First, after speaking with Ms. Zusman in our office, our appellate chief, it's important to point out in this case the government did not waive its right to appeal as they contend. The Supreme Court in *United States v. Benchimol*, B-E-N-C-H-I-M-O-L, at 471 U.S. 453, a 1985 case, which was cited in *United States* 

v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, a First Circuit case, 1990, made it clear that the court cannot imply such a waiver in terms of the plea agreement.

In fact, the Anderson court held that the government could appeal an illegal sentence notwithstanding the fact that it did not expressly reserve its right in a written plea agreement.

Moreover, Judge, I have known, in the years I have been an AUSA, that I cannot waive the United States' appeal rights. That right to waive such rights is with the solicitor general, and that's established by law, 28 CFR 0.163 and that was recognized in *U.S. v. Hare*, H-A-R-E, 269 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2001).

So that's all I have to comment on the government's waiver issue.

Second, the suppression costs. This court has spent a lot of time dealing with that issue as has pretrial. I think Mr. Davis should be complimented for the work he's done in trying to give the court an outline of what the sentencing guidelines are.

In the government's sentencing memo we have concurred with Mr. Davis's, I guess you'd call it original calculations. He has come up with some other ex post facto concerns that the defendants have raised, and I think those can be dealt with by the court.

Suffice it to say, the government is comfortable, based upon the testimony of Jeff Rose at trial and the figures he has provided, that what we put forth in our sentencing memo are accurate and reasonable under these circumstances.

Mr. Rose is available by phone to testify, but quite frankly, I'd hate to waste the time to do so. I think defense counsel has heard the testimony, and I think the court knows his thoughts on the matter.

The third issue is that the defendants have acknowledged that the jury verdicts were factually and legally sufficient, albeit for different reasons.

There can be no doubt in this case, and I think the parties and the court knows that some jurors traveled, I think it was up to 180 miles to attend each day of trial that lasted, I think eight, nine days. And there's no doubt they worked hard to return their verdicts, both the guilty ones and the not guilty ones. Indeed, they were hung on some. That fact weighs heavily in the government's mind as to what should be done today.

The government maintains, however, the testimony of the defendant's grandson and nephew, Dusty Hammond, coupled with the corroborating testimony and physical facts, coupled with the reasons that the defendants seem to rely upon in their sentencing memo on Page 5 all together

supported the jury's verdicts of guilty on Count 2 and likewise on Count 5 when there was testimony from a non-BLM employee Brett Dunten, coupled by Steven Hammond's admission as far as the fire was concerned. In short, the guilty verdicts here, Judge, relied, I'd have to say, almost entirely on non-BLM employees.

Mindful in Count 2, there was the testimony of some BLM employees. The court will recall, however, the government did not argue those facts in its closing argument of that testimony.

Fourth, the defendants have submitted numerous letters from community members attesting to their high character. I have read all the letters. I have no doubt whatsoever to doubt -- or no doubt of their sincerity of the citizens who wrote them. It is true, and it can't be contested, I have spent a lot of time in Burns, that the Hammonds both -- that you are to sentence both have done wonderful things for their community and those deeds are recognized in these letters. And his wife's letter has to be the most heartfelt, certainly, the one you just read.

But my obligation as a prosecutor is to point out not just one side of the equation. And that involves Dusty Hammond. This court has seen the photographs of Dusty Hammond's abuse at the hands of Steven Hammond. Those aren't addressed.

This court has also heard the testimony or at least was aware of how Dusty Hammond was involved and almost burned up in the fire in Count 2. Those facts aren't addressed in these letters.

The court is aware of the testimony of Gordon Choate, a hunting guide, who perhaps like the hunting guide that Steven Hammond interfered with in 1999, had just as much right to public land as any of the Hammonds did.

I have to balance that out in evaluating the Hammonds' conduct in this case. This isn't to distract their good deeds. They have done wonderful things. There's no doubt about it. But they have done things when they have caused problems for citizens using public lands, and they have endangered their own family member that has to be also weighed into the equation.

Mr. Steven Hammond has in fact, as the court knows, been convicted of two offenses, one for unsworn falsification. That was a jury verdict in Harney County. And he was also found guilty by a U.S. magistrate for interference with public lands in which the magistrate thought a probation sentence was appropriate. Somewhat unusual, as the court knows, having dealt with CVB cases.

But all of these issues now addressed here, Judge, and I am not even going to talk about the 3553(a) issue raised by the defendants, it's pretty clear that that

statute doesn't trump the mandatory minimum.

The most important issue for this court is what's the appropriate sentence here.

I have done this for a few years. Unfortunately, in this case, maybe some would say tragically, that this case has not been resolved before trial. I think the parties, the lawyers, I think, tried hard for that, but it seemed that both sides had their heels dug in. And that's unfortunate, and I think that's tragic.

Now the defendants have been found guilty of offenses that Congress has mandated a five-year prison term for. The defendants have asserted such punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. I have found no Supreme Court authority or even appellate court authority that says that a mandatory five-year sentence is a cruel and unusual sentence. I don't think that's a great -- good argument.

I have also already addressed the 3553 argument.

Perhaps the best argument, Judge, the defendants have in this case is the proportionality of what they did to what their sentence is. Perhaps that's the most troubling for the court. It is for the prosecutor who tried the case.

Nevertheless, as I told the defendants shortly after, I think it was midnight, in Pendleton and after you accepted their appellate waivers, I said, quote:

"I want to make sure the Hammonds understand that under the statute, the government is obligated to recommend a five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. I think your lawyer has told you that, but I wanted the record to reflect that you gentlemen have been so warned what sentence is going to be — that I am going to be asking for."

I felt obligated to tell them that night because that's what they were facing. The jury returned verdicts of guilty for offenses with those five-year mandatory minimum sentences.

That being said, I have done my job as I see it.

I think it is lawful. I think it is also ethical what I have recommended to the court.

The proportionality issue is one, however, that I think our constitution gives to our courts. Congress has told you what they think the mandatory sentence should be. I have done my job as the prosecutor trying the case and presenting the evidence the best way I could, and now it's the judiciary's job to impose a sentence that it thinks just. We have made our recommendation of five years as the statute says.

Those are all the comments that I intend to make.

THE COURT: Thank you. For the defense.

MR. BLACKMAN: Your Honor, we have provided the court with an awful lot of information in writing, and with respect to Dwight Hammond, I don't really think there's any material disagreement, for example, about the guideline calculation. I think there's a point question in terms of whether there was any loss of more than a hundred dollars in connection with the 2001 fire. I think the court will recall that the testimony from the BLM range con at trial was that the portion of the public land that burned as a result of that fire was improved, not damaged, by the fire, and there were no suppression costs.

So I believe that the base offense level that we are recommending of 6 as opposed to 7 for the more than a hundred dollars is correct. But again, it's really not material since I don't think it affects where it places Mr. Hammond under the guidelines.

The only other two things I really would like the court to consider, if the court is considering, which we certainly trust that you are, that it would in fact be — and I think proportionality is a part of the Eighth

Amendment. If a sentence would be disproportionate to the offense and the offender, at least the extremes as the courts have said, including the Ninth Circuit on at least a couple of occasions, then the proportionality acknowledgment by the government I think demonstrates that imposing a

60-month sentence on Dwight Hammond for an offense that under the guidelines would be a maximum six months with the -- probation is basically the recommended sentence as a Zone A offense with a person who is 70 years old and has never been convicted of a crime in his life, who has the kind of respect and appreciation of his community that I don't think anyone is disputing about Mr. Hammond, that that really would shock the conscience, frankly. I just think it shocks the conscience to think that it would be permissible to condemn this man to 60 months in prison when all those things are undisputed and true.

If the court is considering, and, again, I think the government's acknowledging that it's the court's responsibility to consider its constitutional obligations under the Eighth Amendment in fashioning a sentence, then with respect to the 2001 fire, as we say in our memorandum, the facts that support that verdict are the admission that occurred at the time. There's no dispute that the Hammonds called in to the BLM dispatch and checked to see if a fire could be set that day.

It's not disputed that there had been a fire that got off their land two years earlier and they had received a stern warning from the BLM that if fire set on their private land escaped onto the public land again, there would be legal consequences, so they were warned.

The evidence as to where ignitions were set on the private land and adjacent to the fence line with the public land permits, certainly the jury's conclusion, that they intended that fire to cross over into the public land.

And those facts are sufficient to support the verdict. And we would urge the court to make those findings as the basis and that it is not sufficiently reliable to conclude that the Dusty Hammond version of that event is more likely than not correct.

We have -- I am not going to rehash it all, but his testimony was completely inconsistent with the testimony and the records of the hunting that was done on Section 16 in 2001 by Mr. Gustafson, by Mr. Taylor, by the Fish & Wildlife records.

So we would urge, if the court is considering looking with favor at our Eighth Amendment argument, that you specifically find those — that the facts that support that jury verdict are the facts that I have just recited.

I don't know if you have any questions that would be of any assistance to you in all the legal stuff we have thrown at you in the last week, but if you have any questions, I would be more than happy to address them.

The only other thing I would say, and this is really a practical request, it's if you would in fact find that the nature of this offense was in fact a business

regulation offense so that these convictions do not prohibit these men from possessing firearms, which, you know, the only reason they have rifles is because you can't really run a ranch unless you are able to have some opportunity to keep some varmints at bay. So we would ask for that finding as well.

Other than that, I think I have said it all more than once in our memoranda. But if you have any questions, I would be happy to address them.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Matasar.

MR. MATASAR: Your Honor, just a few things about Steven Hammond. As far as the fire suppression costs, we provided a memo late yesterday which explains our position on that. I won't go over that, although I would ask that you make a finding.

I agree with what Mr. Blackman said about the basis for the 2001 fire, and so I won't address that but just ask that you make a finding.

Steven Hammond has some criminal history issues, which I will just ask the court to make a specific finding. We have argued in the memo about the Fish & Wildlife exception to the -- to one of his convictions.

THE COURT: Had you ever heard of a landowner's permit before this case?

MR. MATASAR: I had not, but obviously you have.

THE COURT: Any of the lawyers ever killed an 1 2 animal on a landowner's permit? 3 MR. MATASAR: I have not. 4 THE COURT: Your judge has. 5 MR. MATASAR: Yes. And as I found as I was 6 looking into the landowner permit rules, everybody else knows about them before I did. So it's quite common, as you 8 know, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: It's not common in big cities. MR. MATASAR: Yes. It's not. 10 I would say that -- sorry, Your Honor. I'm 11 12 resting here. I hurt my back the other day, so that's why I 13 am resting a bit on the table. 14 THE COURT: If you need to be seated, go ahead. 15 MR. MATASAR: No. I think I can stay. There is --16 There is -- I think maybe I will. 17 Your Honor, I have known Steven Hammond and Dwight 18 Hammond for nearly 20 years, and I think you know them now 19 as well. You know them from the community's letters that 20 you have gotten. People like 84-year old Ellington Peek who 21 runs the video market, from the Farm Bureau, from people who 22 know his kids at school, from people who know him at school. 23 There are people who were at Crane when Steven Hammond was a 24 student. You know, from what you have read, people who know 25 him at church; people who know him from his volunteer work

in the community.

And I have been here enough times in the last four years, Your Honor, on this case and one other case to know that you read the material that we put in front of you.

And Earlyna Hammond was going to read her letter. The reason why I gave it to you late was not because we were lazy but because she had planned to read it, but I think she would have had trouble getting through it, and so we provided it to the court this morning.

I would ask Your Honor, as Mr. Blackman did, that you go along with our memo. That you feel -- I believe that under the proportionary principles explained by Mr. Papagni, which are based on the Eighth Amendment, that Mr. Steven Hammond belongs in what the guidelines calls Zone B, which allows for a probationary sentence. We think the difference and one of the reasons why the proportionality principle is important is the difference between a probationary sentence and the mandatory minimum is so great.

As far as the other issues raised by Mr. Papagni, the notice of appeal and such, I will rely on our memo, the Fourth Circuit case, the undecided situation in the Ninth Circuit.

So other than that, Your Honor, like Mr. Blackman, we are ready to answer questions from you if you have any either now or after you come back, but we ask you to

sentence our clients in the -- along the lines we have suggested in our memorandum.

THE COURT: I do have this question: We had argument on it, but is -- what indication, if any, do you have more than I have that when this five-year mandatory minimum was put in in the Terrorism Act that this sort of activity is what was anticipated? Is there anything?

MR. MATASAR: I can only say, Your Honor, that my understanding, from what I included in the memo, was that, you know, this statute is about through fire or explosives. I think the focus of the statute seemed to be the explosive part, the intentional aspect of it. I indicated all the other sections here, they talk about foreign nationals, they talk about terrorism this and terrorism there. But I see no indication that this — that this kind of activity was intended in that statute.

MR. BLACKMAN: And Your Honor, I think the most significant, if you are looking, really, at the legislation, the most significant indication of that is in the definition of federal crime of terrorism, which explicitly does not include the 844(f)(1).

THE COURT: I read that in the memo.

MR. BLACKMAN: So I mean, it does strike us as one of those legislative -- I mean, it's a huge bill. Sometimes I think the Congress does things that it's not intended, and

the best indication that that's not what they intended is that.

THE COURT: All right. We'll come back at 12:30 for the actual sentencing, but I do have these comments:

The attorneys in this case are all remarkable.

The -- you do your job. But the argument Mr. Papagni made on proportionality was highly moral. I appreciate that.

And this sort of -- I have been doing this for 39 years, and this is my last sentencing. I will impose a sentence that I believe is defensible under the law but also one that is defensible to my conscience.

And this is not about me, although there's a couple of indicatings here that I have a -- just a -- a little comment about. I didn't -- I was halfway through this before I realized my entire family is here -- I am just taking a moment to get through some of the emotion -- along with loved ones from the court, and I wouldn't have had this opportunity without each of you. I appreciate it.

I love this country. All of us have responsibilities which can't be defined without our -- people talk about rights. That's only one side of the coin. Years ago I heard Bishop Fulton Sheen. He gave a wonderful address on that in Washington, D.C.

And so we have our role to play in a wonderful

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legal system, and unlike some of my colleagues who will have
people make these sort of comments after they are no longer
here, I get to make it today. I am grateful.
         We'll come back to your case at 12:30.
         Thank you.
         MR. BLACKMAN:
                        Thank you.
                         (Recess.)
         THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated.
         Counsel, anything further?
         MR. MATASAR: No, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: And Mr. Dwight Hammond and Mr. Steven
Hammond, have you read the presentence reports in the case?
         MR. MATASAR: There was no formal presentence.
         THE COURT: All right. Have you talked to your
lawyers about all the issues we have been talking about here
today?
         DEFENDANT STEVEN HAMMOND: Yes.
         DEFENDANT DWIGHT HAMMOND:
                                    Yes.
         THE COURT: All right. If you have a statement
that you wish to make, before I impose sentence, now is the
time to do that. All right? So if either of you do, you
decide who speaks first. I don't really care.
         DEFENDANT DWIGHT HAMMOND: I really don't have
anything other than what my counsel would fill in.
         THE COURT: All right.
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DEFENDANT STEVEN HAMMOND: And likewise, I 1 2 appreciate all the time that's been spent on this. 3 THE COURT: All right. There are a number of 4 issues that need findings, and these could be organized a 5 little better than they are. 6 First, the government has objected to me advancing 7 the sentencing to today, and I understand that. 8 The objection is denied. The last of these events 9 happened in 2006, and I am so familiar with all of the facts here and this situation that it would be not appropriate to 10 11 burden some other judge with handling the sentencing here. 12 MR. MATASAR: Your Honor, I am going to be seated, 13 if I may. 14 THE COURT: Excuse me? 15 MR. MATASAR: I am going to be seated, if I may. 16 THE COURT: You may, of course. 17 MR. MATASAR: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I just 18 can't --19 THE COURT: You can all be seated as far as I am 20 concerned. That's all right. 21 MR. MATASAR: Thank you. 22 THE COURT: Now, whether the government waived its 23 right to appeal is frankly not a matter for me. That's a 24 question for the Ninth Circuit, and I am not going to make 25 any findings on that.

With regard to suppression costs, the 15,000 and change that the government has in their -- I think Page 11 of their memo, the argument is there, but the evidence supporting it is not.

And frankly, if this would be another situation and the government had a motion to postpone to be able to submit its materials, it probably would be a good motion. We don't have it here. I am not going to extend this, but nevertheless, I am not going to count that as part of the loss.

With regard to the sufficiency of the jury verdicts, they were sufficient. And what happened here, if you analyze this situation, if you listened to the trial as I did and looked at the pretrial matters, there was a — there were statements that Mr. Steven Hammond had given that indicated he set some fires, and the jury accepted that for what it was.

There are other evidence that was significant, and none of us know, in the minds of each juror, what is significant. That's part of the jury system. But that was really the key thing that happened here.

With regard to character letters and that sort of thing, they were tremendous. These are people who have been a salt in their community and liked, and I appreciate that.

In looking at Dusty Hammond's testimony, he was a

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youngster when these things happened. I am sure he remembered things as best he could. There was, frankly, an incident, apparently it was removal of tattoos, that would have colored any young person's thinking, and if that's what happened, it can't be defended, of course, but that's not what's before the court today.

Now, I will take up the matter of the mandatory minimum in a moment.

In looking at Dwight Hammond's case, the base offense level here is either -- well, it's either -- the offense level is either a 6 or a 7, and it depends on whether or not I find there was at least a hundred dollars in damages. Well, the damage was juniper trees and sagebrush, and there might have been a hundred dollars, but it doesn't really matter. It doesn't affect the quidelines, and I am not sure how much sagebrush a hundred dollars worth is. But I think this probably will be -- I think mother nature's probably taken care of any injury. I don't think that's the question. There would be -- you know, as far as some of these civil matters, there's a civil proceeding going on in Pendleton. That can take care of that. There's also administrative proceedings. There's going to be a fearsome penalty paid by these two gentlemen for the decisions they made and the actions they took.

At any rate, I find that Dwight Hammond's

guideline level is from 0 to 6 months.

With regard to Steven Hammond, there are some interesting findings there because the guidelines talk about using the guideline in effect at the time of an incident, so in this case, the latter one, the 2006 fire.

Well, those would be the 2005 guidelines because that's when the -- those are the ones in effect at the time. And the guidelines are pretty clear that that's to happen. And then on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit made itself one of two circuits in the *Ortland* case that said, well, there's an ex post facto constitutionality problem with that. And therefore, I am going to use the 2000 guidelines, which reflected back to the 2001 fire for that one. Well, if -- that results in a -- I believe a level 10.

And then we look at the criminal history category. The landowner preference violation, there's no question for anyone who is an outdoors person that that has to do with the fish and game matter. Nevertheless, the allegation was an unsworn falsification, which is — can apply to lots of things.

Well, whether it's a fish and game matter or whether it just overstates the criminal history, I am going to find the criminal history category for Steven Hammond to be a III.

And with regard to the sentences, I --

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MR. MATASAR: Your Honor, from what you said, it
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     sounded like you would have meant II, if you were
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     considering the overstating.
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               THE COURT: And that's 10 to 16? I may have --
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               MR. MATASAR: Yeah. A level II -- a 10/II would
    be 8 to 14.
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               PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: If you drop down to II,
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     that's correct. If it remained at a III, it would be 10 to
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     16.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
               PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: So if you drop down to
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     II, it would be 8 to 14.
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               THE REPORTER: You need to turn your mike on.
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               THE COURT: I am dropping down from -- I
15
     apologize -- from a IV to a III.
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               MR. MATASAR: I think it's from a III to II. I am
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     not --
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               PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: Hold on. We are talking
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     apples and oranges. He is talking about the amount of
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     points and you are talking about a category.
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               MR. MATASAR: Oh, yes. So --
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               PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: So three points puts us
     in category II.
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               MR. MATASAR: Okay. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And the guideline range there is?
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PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: At a level 10, would be 1 2 8 to 14. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 PROBATION OFFICER DAVIS: You are welcome. 5 THE COURT: I am not going to say that the firearms are a business -- fit under the business 6 7 requirement exception. I understand the problems in running 8 a ranch out there without a firearm. In fact, I think the 9 other name for a Ruger .223 is a farm gun, and for predators 10 that certainly comes into play, but nevertheless, I am not 11 going to include that. I am not going to make that finding 12 under that exception. 13 So I find that the guideline range for Steven 14 Hammond is a level 10 with a criminal history category of II 15 for 8 to 14 months. 16 Now, with regard to the mandatory minimum, I don't 17 need to repeat that -- this, but you all know that -- and 18 because you are experienced before me that I think 19 Mr. Lessley told me a short time ago that he and Mr. Papagni 20 came in about the same time to work both sides of these 21 cases, and I have been a -- I have been a pretty faithful 22 observer of the guidelines when they are required to be and 23 their requirements and have been working with sentences for 24 39 years. 25 I remember my first sentence for a petty offense,

and I knew what I wanted to do. I just didn't know how to say it. And that was a different problem back then.

I am not going to apply the mandatory minimum and because, to me, to do so under the Eighth Amendment would result in a sentence which is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses here.

And with regard to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, this sort of conduct could not have been conduct intended under that statute.

When you say, you know, what if you burn sagebrush in the suburbs of Los Angeles where there are houses up those ravines? Might apply. Out in the wilderness here, I don't think that's what the Congress intended. And in addition, it just would not be — would not meet any idea I have of justice, proportionality. I am not supposed to use the word "fairness" in criminal law. I know that I had a criminal law professor a long time ago yell at me for doing that. And I don't do that. But this — it would be a sentence which would shock the conscience to me.

So I have considered these guidelines and the sentences in this case.

Well, first of all, are there other findings, gentlemen, that you require?

MR. PAPAGNI: Not by the government.

MR. MATASAR: No, Your Honor.

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MR. BLACKMAN: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: With regard to Dwight Hammond, I have given you the guidelines which I am applying, and I have considered the guidelines and the 3553(a) factors, and based on these comments I have made, as to Count 2 -- that's the correct count number, right? THE CLERK: Yes. THE COURT: The defendant is committed to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement for a period of three months. Upon release, the defendant shall serve a three-year term of supervised release subject to the standard conditions and the following special conditions: The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by probation. The defendant shall disclose all assets and liabilities to probation and not transfer, sell, give away, or otherwise convey any asset with a fair market value in excess of \$500 without approval of probation. The defendant shall not make application for any loan or credit arrangement or lease without approval of probation. And the defendant shall authorize release of -- to

probation a financial information by appropriate means.

No fine is ordered.

The defendant shall pay a fee assessment in the amount of \$200 due immediately in full.

Now, Mr. Hammond, you have the right to appeal from this sentence under certain circumstances. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of entry of judgment, and that will be no later than tomorrow when that judgment is entered. If you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and if you request, the clerk will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf.

Do you understand, sir?

DEFENDANT DWIGHT HAMMOND: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, with regard to Steven Hammond, I have also considered the guidelines as I have commented this morning and considered the 3553(a) factors.

 $\label{eq:AndI} \mbox{ And I have one question for probation here before } \mbox{ I do this.}$ 

(Conferred with probation.)

THE COURT: As to Count 2, the defendant is committed to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement for a period of 12 months and one day.

As to Count 5, the defendant is committed to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement for a period of 12 months and one day, said sentence to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count 2.

 $\label{eq:theorem} \mbox{The defendant shall cooperate in the collection} \\ \mbox{of $--$}$ 

First of all, the defendant shall serve a three-year term of supervised release subject to the standard conditions and the following special conditions:

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{DNA}}\xspace$  .

The defendant shall disclose all assets and liabilities to probation and not transfer or convey any asset with a fair market value in excess of \$500 without approval of probation.

The defendant shall pay full restitution to the victims identified -- I'm sorry. I have eliminated that from the sentence. I'm sorry.

The defendant shall not make application for a loan or credit arrangement or enter into a lease agreement without approval of probation.

The defendant shall authorize release to probation a financial information by appropriate means.

No fine is ordered.

The defendant shall pay a fee assessment in the amount of \$200 due immediately in full.

Mr. Hammond, you have the right to appeal from your sentence under certain circumstances, and a notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the entry of

judgment. If you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and if you request, the clerk of court will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT STEVEN HAMMOND: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, gentlemen, the decisions you made because you couldn't comply with requests from government agencies, whether they were justified in every instance or not, are going to result in grievous losses to you and your families. And that's how you end up in a place like this.

I won't be the judge on any potential supervised release violation. I will be gravely disappointed if you end up before the court again in that regard. People have said a lot of nice things about you. You have a lot to live up to, quite frankly.

And I know that for -- you know, it's one thing to have the -- as one letter said, the cowboy code of ethics or the Wyoming code and all that, but we are all a part of one country, and it's a great country. And even when there are requirements that seem inappropriate, I'm not saying that all of them were; they weren't, we have to learn to live within them or sometimes the consequences are deep.

Anything further?

MR. BLACKMAN: Your Honor, just a couple technical

things. 1 2 Number one, would the court authorize voluntary 3 surrender? THE COURT: Yes. How long do you request? 5 MR. PAPAGNI: I think the sentencing was set for 6 December 11th. I would expect we could set it over until after the first of the year. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. BLACKMAN: If we could have an early January surrender date. 10 11 THE COURT: You may. 12 MR. BLACKMAN: And would you please recommend the 13 Sheridan Camp. 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. BLACKMAN: Then the only other thing, I think 16 you said the fee assessment in Dwight Hammond's case was \$200. I think technically it's 100. 17 18 THE COURT: It should be 100. 19 MR. BLACKMAN: 100. 20 THE COURT: Yeah. I was using the same form. I 21 only had one of them, and that's what happened. It should 22 be 100. 23 MR. MATASAR: Your Honor, could we confer with the 24 family about perhaps staggering Steven Hammond's turn-in 25 date? Mr. Dwight Hammond, if he surrenders in January, may

get out in a few months. 1 2 THE COURT: Any objection? 3 MR. PAPAGNI: No. 4 THE COURT: All right. Now, I want you to do it 5 today so that I can -- because I am going to have these 6 judgments prepared today. MR. MATASAR: I think that makes sense, Your 8 We will do it. We will confer now, and before we 9 leave the courthouse, we will get word to your staff. 10 THE COURT: That's fine. All right. Anything 11 further? 12 MR. PAPAGNI: I was going to point out what Mr. Blackman did about the assessment. We caught that one. 13 14 And of course, the defendants have waived their 15 appeal rights, and I think the court said to the extent they 16 have appeal rights that are limited, that applies, so that's 17 all I have, Judge. 18 THE COURT: They are. You have waived most of 19 your appeal rights. 20 The other thing is I find that both defendants 21 have waived the preparation of a presentence report. 22 All right? MR. BLACKMAN: And Your Honor, we would stipulate 23 24 that through the trial and all the submissions you had more 25 than sufficient information to proceed to sentencing without

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     a presentence report.
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               MR. MATASAR: Yes, Your Honor.
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               MR. BLACKMAN: We stipulate.
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               MR. MATASAR: For Steven Hammond too.
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
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               MR. MATASAR: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. We are in recess. I would
     like to see just counsel over at the sidebar for a minute.
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               THE CLERK: Court's in recess.
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               (The proceedings were concluded this
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               30th day of October, 2012.)
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I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
 1
     correct transcript of the oral proceedings had in the
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 3
     above-entitled matter, to the best of my skill and ability,
     dated this 20th day of November, 2012.
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     /s/Kristi L. Anderson
     Kristi L. Anderson, Certified Realtime Reporter
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